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Abstract. For any pair (X,Z) of correlated random variables we can
think of Z as a randomized function of X. Provided that Z is short, one
can make this function computationally efficient by allowing it to be only
approximately correct. In folklore this problem is known as simulating
auxiliary inputs. This idea of simulating auxiliary information turns out
to be a powerful tool in computer science, finding applications in com-
plexity theory, cryptography, pseudorandomness and zero-knowledge. In
this paper we revisit this problem, achieving the following results:
(a) We discuss and compare efficiency of known results, finding the flaw
in the best known bound claimed in the TCC’14 paper ”How to Fake
Auxiliary Inputs”.
(b) We present a novel boosting algorithm for constructing the simula-
tor. Our technique essentially fixes the flaw. This boosting proof is
of independent interest, as it shows how to handle ”negative mass”
issues when constructing probability measures in descent algorithms.
(c) Our bounds are much better than bounds known so far. To make the
simulator (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable we need the complexityO
(
s · 25ℓǫ−2
)
in time/circuit size, which is better by a factor ǫ−2 compared to
previous bounds. In particular, with our technique we (finally) get
meaningful provable security for the EUROCRYPT’09 leakage-resilient
stream cipher instantiated with a standard 256-bit block cipher, like
AES256.
Our boosting technique utilizes a two-step approach. In the first step we
shift the current result (as in gradient or sub-gradient descent algorithms)
and in the separate step we fix the biggest non-negative mass constraint
violation (if applicable).
Keywords: simulating auxiliary inputs, boosting, leakage-resilient cryptogra-
phy, stream ciphers, computational indistinguishability
1 Introduction
1.1 Simulating Correlated Information.
Informal Problem Statement Let (X,Z) ∈ X × Z be a pair of correlated
random variables. We can think of Z as a randomized function of Z. More
⋆ This work was partly supported by the WELCOME/2010-4/2 grant founded within
the framework of the EU Innovative Economy Operational Programme.
precisely, consider the randomized function h : X → Z, which for every x outputs
z with probability Pr[Z = z|X = x]. By definition it satisfies
(X,h(X))
d
= (X,Z) (1)
however the function h is inefficient as we need to hardcode the conditional
probability table of Z|X . It is natural to ask, if this limitation can be overcome
Q1: Can we represent Z as an efficient function of X?
Not surprisingly, it turns out that a positive answer may be given only in compu-
tational settings. Note that replacing the equality in Equation (1) by closeness
in the total variation distance (allowing the function h to make some mistakes
with small probability) is not enough 1. This discussion leads to the following
reformulated question
Q1’: Can we efficiently simulate Z as a function of X?
Why it matters? Aside from being very foundational, this question is relevant
to many areas of computer science. We will not discuss these applications in
detail, as they are well explained in [JP14]. Below we only mention where such
a generic simulator can be applied, to show that this problem is indeed well-
motivated.
(a) Complexity Theory. From the simulator one can derive Dense Model The-
orem [RTTV08], Impagliazzo’s hardcore lemma [Imp95] and a version of
Szemeredis Regularity Lemma [FK99].
(b) Cryptography. The simulator can be applied for settings where Z models
short leakage from a secret state X . It provides tools for improving and
simplifying proofs in leakage-resilient cryptography, in particular for leakage-
resilient stream ciphers [JP14].
(c) Pseudorandomness. Using the simulator one can conclude results called chain
rules [GW11], which quantify pseudorandomness in conditioned distribu-
tions. They can be also applied to leakage-resilient cryptography.
(d) Zero-knowledge. The simulator can be applied to represent the text ex-
changed in verifier-prover interactions Z from the common input X [CLP15].
Thus, the simulator may be used as a tool to unify, simplify and improve many
results. Having briefly explained the motivation we now turn to answer the posed
question, leaving a more detailed discussion of some applications to Section 1.6.
1 Indeed, consider the simplest case Z = {0, 1}, define X to be uniform over X =
{0, 1}n, and take Z = f(X) where f is a function which is 0.5-hard to predict by
circuits exponential in n, Then (X,h(X)) and (X,Z) are at least 1
4
-away in total
variation
1.2 Problem Statement
The problem of simulating auxiliary inputs in the computational setting can be
defined precisely as follows
Given a random variables X ∈ {0, 1}n and correlated Z ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, what
is the minimal complexity sh of a (randomized) function h such that the
distributions of h(X) and Z are (ǫ, s)-indistinguishable given X , that is
|ED(X,h(X))− ED(X,Z)| < ǫ
holds for all (deterministic) circuits D of size s?
The indistinguishability above is understood with respect to deterministic cir-
cuits. However it doesn’t really matter for distinguishing two distributions, where
randomized and deterministic distinguishers are equally powerful2.
It turns out that it is relatively easy3 to construct a simulator h with a
polynomial blowup in complexity, that is when
sh = poly
(
s, ǫ−1, 2ℓ
)
.
However, more challenging is to minimize the dependency on ǫ−1. This problem
is especially important for cryptography, where security definitions require the
advantage ǫ to be possibly small. Indeed, for meaningful security ǫ = 2−80 or at
least ǫ = 2−40 it makes a difference whether we lose ǫ−2 or ǫ−4. We will see later
how much inefficient bounds here may affect provable security of stream ciphers.
1.3 Related Works
Original work of Jetchev and Pietrzak (TCC’14) The authors showed
that Z can be “approximately” computed from X by an “efficient” function h.
Theorem 1 ([JP14], corrected). For every distribution (X,Z) on {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}ℓ and every ǫ, s, there exists a “simulator” h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ such that
(a) (X,h(X)) and (X,Z) are (ǫ, s)-indistinguishable
(b) h is of complexity sh = O
(
s · 24ℓǫ−4
)
The proof uses the standard min-max theorem. In the statement above we correct
two flaws. One is a missing factor of 2ℓ. The second (and more serious) one is
the (corrected) factor ǫ−4, claimed incorrectly to be ǫ−2. The flaws are discussed
in Appendix A.
2 If two distributions can be distinguished by a randomized circuit, we can fix a specific
choice of coins to achieve at least the same advantage
3 We briefly sketch the idea of the proof: note first that it is easy to construct a
simulator for every single distinguisher. Having realized that, we can use the min-
max theorem to switch the quantifiers and get one simulator for all distinguishers.
Vadhan and Zheng (CRYPTO’13) The authors derived a version of Theorem 1
but with incomparable bounds
Theorem 2 ([VZ13]). For every distribution X,Z on {0, 1}n × {0, 1}ℓ and
every ǫ, s, there exists a “simulator” h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ such that
(a) (X,h(X)) and (X,Z) are (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable
(b) h is of complexity sh = O
(
s · 2ℓǫ−2 + 2ℓǫ−4
)
The proof follows from a general regularity theorem which is based on their uni-
form min-max theorem. The additive loss of O
(
2ℓǫ−4
)
appears as a consequence
of a sophisticated weight-updating procedure. This error is quite large and may
dominate the main term for many settings (whenever s≪ ǫ−2).
As we show later, Theorem 2 and Theorem 1 give in fact comparable security
bounds when applied to leakage-resilient stream ciphers (see Section 1.6)
1.4 Our Results
We reduce the dependency of the simulator complexity sh on the advantage ǫ to
only a factor of ǫ−2, from the factor of ǫ−4.
Theorem 3 (Our Simulator). For every distribution X,Z on {0, 1}n×{0, 1}ℓ
and every ǫ, s, there exists a “simulator” h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ such that
(a) (X,h(X)) and (X,Z) are (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable
(b) h is of complexity sh = O
(
s · 25ℓǫ−2
)
Below in Table 1 we compare our result to previous works.
Author Technique Advantage Size Cost of simulating
[JP14] (Theorem 1) Min-Max
ǫ s
sh = O
(
s · 24ℓǫ−4
)
[VZ13] (Theorem 2) Complicated Boosting sh = O
(
s · 2ℓ/ǫ2 + 2ℓǫ−4
)
This paper (Theorem 3) Simple Boosting sh = O
(
s · 25ℓǫ−2
)
Table 1. The complexity of simulating ℓ-bit auxiliary information given required in-
distinguishability strength, depending on the proof technique.
Our result is slightly worse in terms of dependency ℓ, but outperforms pre-
vious results in terms of dependency on ǫ−1. However, the second dependency
is more crucial for cryptographic applications. Note that the typical choice is
sub-logarithmic leakage, that is ℓ = o
(
log ǫ−1
)
is asymptotic settings4 (see for
example [CLP15]). Stated in non-asymptotic settings this assumption translates
to ℓ < c log ǫ−1 where c is a small constant (for example c = 112 see [Pie09]). In
these settings, we outperform previous results.
4 This is a direct consequence of the fact that we want ℓ fits poly-preserving reductions
To illustrate this, suppose we want to achieve security ǫ = 2−60 simulating
just one bit from a 256-bit input. As it follows from Table 1, previous bounds
are useless as they give the complexity bigger than 2256 which is the worst
complexity of all boolean functions over the chosen domain. In settings like
this, only our bound can be applied to conclude meaningful results. For more
concrete examples of settings where our bounds are even only meaningful, we
refer to Table 2 in Section 1.6.
1.5 Our Techniques
Our approach utilizes a simple boosting technique: as long as the condition (a)
in Theorem 3 fails, we can use the distinguisher to improve the simulator. This
makes our algorithm constructive with respect to oracle answers, similarly to
other boosting proofs. In short, if we find D such that
ED(X,Z)− ED(X,h(X)) > ǫ
then we construct h′ according to the equation5
Pr[h′(x) = z] = Pr[h(x) = z] + γ · Shift (D(x, z)) + Corr(x, z)
where
(a) The parameter γ is afixed step chosen in advance (its optimal value depends
on ǫ and ℓ and is calculated in the proof.)
(b) Shift (D(x, z)) is a shifted version of D, so that
∑
z Shift (D(x, z)) = 0. This
restriction correspond to the fact that we want to preserve the constraint∑
z h(x, z) = 1. More precisely, Shift (D(x, z)) = D(x, z)− Ez′←Uℓ D(x, z)
(c) Corr(x, z) is a correction term used to fix (some of) possibly negative weights.
The procedure is being repeated in a loop, over and over again. The main tech-
nical difficulty is to show that it eventually stops after not so many iterations.
Note that in every such a step the complexity cost of the shifting term is
O
(
2ℓ · size(D)
)
6. In our solution, the correction term does a search over z looking
for the biggest negative mass, and redistributes it over the remaining points.
Intuitively, it works because the total negative mass is getting smaller with
every step. See ?? 1 for a pseudo-code description of the algorithm and the rest
of Section 3 for a proof.
1.6 Applications
Better security for the EUROCRYPT’09 stream cipher. The first con-
struction of leakage-resilient stream cipher was proposed by Dziembowski and
Pietrzak in [DP08]. On Figure 1 below we present a simplified version of this
cipher [Pie09], based on a weak pseudorandom function (wPRF).
5 As we already mentioned, we can assume that D is deterministic without loss of
generality. Then all the terms in the equation are well-defined.
6 By definition, it requires computing the average of D(x, ·) over 2ℓ elements
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Fig. 1. The EUROCRYPT’09 stream cipher (adaptive leakage). F denotes a weak
pseudorandom function. By Ki and xi we denote, respectively, values of the secret
state and keystream bits. Leakages are denotted in gray with Li.
Jetchev and Pietrzak in [JP14] showed how to use the simulator theorem to
simplify the security analysis of the EUROCRYPT’09 cipher. The cipher security
depends on the complexity of the simulator as explained in Theorem 1 and
Remark 1. We consider the following setting:
– number of rounds q = 16,
– F instantiated with AES256 (as in [JP14])
– cipher security we aim for ǫ′ = 2−40
– λ = 3 bits of leakage per round
The concrete bounds for (q, ǫ′, s′)-security of the cipher (which roughly speaking
means that q consecutive outputs is (s′, ǫ′)-pseudorandom, see Section 2 for a
formal definition) are given in Table 2 below. We ommit calculations as they
are merely putting parameters from Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 into
Remark 1 and assuming that AES as a weak PRF is (ǫ, s)-secure for any pairs
s/ǫ ≈ 2k (following the similar example in [JP14]).
Analysis/Authors wPRF security Leakage Advantage ǫ′ Size s′
[JP14] (Theorem 1)
256 λ = 3 2−40
0
[VZ13] (Theorem 2) 0
this paper (Theorem 3) 266
Table 2. The security of the EUROCRYPT’09 stream cipher, instantiated with
AES256 as a weak PRF of rouhgly k = 256 bits of security. In this settngs only
our new bounds provide non-trivial bounds.
More generaly, we can give the following comparison of security bounds for
different wPRF-based stream ciphers, in terms of time-sccess ratio. The bounds
in Table 3 follow from the simple lemma in Section 4, which shows how the
time-success ratio changes under explicit reduction formulas.
Cipher Analysis Proof techniques Security level Comments
(1) [Pie09] Pseudoentropy chain rules k′ ≪ 1
8
k large number of blocks
(1) [JP14] Aux. Inputs Simulator (corr.) k′ ≈ k
6
− 5
6
λ
(1) [VZ13] Aux. Inputs Simulator k′ ≈ k
6
− 1
3
λ
(1) This work Aux. Inputs Simulator k′ ≈ k
4
− 4
3
λ
(2) [FPS12] Pseudoentropy chain rules k′ ≈ k
5
− 3
5
λ large public seed
(3) [YS13] Square-friendly apps. k′ ≈ k
4
− 3
4
λ only in minicrypt
Table 3. Different bounds for wPRF-based leakage-resilient stream ciphers. k is the se-
curity level of the underlying wPRF. The value k′ is the security level for the cipher, un-
derstood in terms of time-success ratio. the numbers denote: (1) The EUROCRYPT’09
cipher, (2) The CSS’10/CHESS’12 cipher, (3) The CT-RSA’13 cipher.
1.7 Organization
In Section 2 we discuss basic notions and definitions. The proof of Theorem 3
appears in Section 3.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Notions
Let V be a finite set, and D be a class of deterministic real functions on V . For
any two real functions f1, f2 on V , we say that f1, f2 are (D, ǫ)-indistinguishable
if
∀D ∈ D :
∣∣∣ E
x∼V
D(x) · f1(x) − E
x∼V
D(x) · f2(x))
∣∣∣ 6 ǫ
If D consists of all circuits of size s we say that f1, f2 are (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable.
2.2 Stream ciphers definitions
We start with the definition of weak pseudorandom functions, which are com-
putationally indistinguishable from random functions, when queried on random
inputs and fed with uniform secret key.
Definition 1 (Weak pseudorandom functions). A function F : {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is an (ǫ, s, q)-secure weak PRF if its outputs on q random
inputs are indistinguishable from random by any distinguisher of size s, that is
|Pr [D ((Xi)
q
i=1 ,F((K,Xi)
q
i=1) = 1]− Pr [D ((Xi)
q
i=1 , (Ri)
q
i=1) = 1]| 6 ǫ
where the probability is over the choice of the random Xi ← {0, 1}
n, the choice
of a random key K ← {0, 1}k and Ri ← {0, 1}
m conditioned on Ri = Rj if
Xi = Xj for some j < i.
Stream ciphers generate a keystream in a recursive manner. The security requires
the output stream should be indistinguishable from uniform7.
Definition 2 (Stream ciphers). A stream-cipher SC : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}n is a function that need to be initialized with a secret state S0 ∈ {0, 1}
k
and produces a sequence of output blocks X1, X2, ... computed as
(Si, Xi) := SC(Si−1).
A stream cipher SC is (ǫ, s, q)-secure if for all 1 6 i 6 q, the random variable Xi
is (s, ǫ)-pseudorandom given X1, ..., Xi−1 (the probability is also over the choice
of the initial random key S0).
Now we define the security of leakage resilient stream ciphers, which follow the
“only computation leaks” assumption.
Definition 3 (Leakage-resilient stream ciphers). A leakage-resilient stream-
cipher is (ǫ, s, q, λ)-secure if it is (ǫ, s, q)-secure as defined above, but where
the distinguisher in the j-th round gets λ bits of arbitrary deceptively chosen
leakage about the secret state accessed during this round. More precisely, before
(Sj , Xj) := SC(Sj−1) is computed, the distinguisher can choose any leakage func-
tion fj with range {0, 1}
λ, and then not only get Xj, but also Λj := fj(Sˆj−1),
where Sˆj−1 denotes the part of the secret state that was modified (i.e., read
and/or overwritten) in the computation SC(Sj−1).
2.3 Security of leakage-resilient stream ciphers.
Best provable secure constructions of leakage-resilient stream ciphers are based
on so called weak PRFs, primitives which look random when queried on random
inputs ([Pie09,FPS12,JP14,DP10,YS13]). The most recent (TCC’14) analysis is
based on a version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 (Proving Security of Stream Ciphers [JP14]). If F is a
(ǫF , sF , 2)-secure weak PRF then SC
F is a (ǫ′, s′, q, λ)-secure leakage resilient
stream cipher where
ǫ′ = 4q
√
ǫF 2λ, s
′ = Θ(1) ·
sF ǫ
′4
24λ
.
Remark 1 (The exact complexity loss). The inspection of the proof in [JP14]
shows that sF equals the complexity of the simulator h in Theorem 1 applied to
the class of all circuits of size s′, where ǫ is replaced by ǫ′.
7 We note that in a more standard notion the entire stream X1, . . . , Xq is indistin-
guishable from random. This is implied by the notion above by a standard hybrid
argument, with a loss of a multiplicative factor of q in the distinguishing advantage.
2.4 Time-Success Ratio
The running time (circuit size) s and success probability ǫ of attacks (practical
and theoretical) against a particular primitive or protocol may vary. For this
reason Luby [LM94] introduced the time-success ratio t
ǫ
as a universal measure
of security. This model is widely used to analyze provable security, cf. [BL13]
and related works.
Definition 4 (Security by Time-Success Ratio [LM94]). A primitive P
is said to be 2k-secure if for every adversary with time resources (circuit size in
the nonuniform model) s, the success probability in breaking P (advantage) is at
most ǫ < s · 2−k. We also say that the time-success ratio of P is 2k, or that is
has k bits of security.
For example, AES with a 256-bit random key is believed to have 256 bits of
security as a weak PRF8.
3 Proof of Theorem 3
For technical convenience, we attempt to efficiently approximate the conditional
probability function Pr[Z = z|X = x] rather than building the sampler directly.
Once we end with building an efficient approximation h(x, z), we transform it
into a sampler hsim which outputs z with probability h(x, z) (this transformation
yields only a loss of 2ℓ). We are going to prove the following fact
For every function g on X ×Z which is a X -conditional probability mass
function over Z (that is g(x, z) > 0 for all x, z and
∑
z g(x, z) = 1 for
every x), and for every class D closed under complements9 there exists
h such that
(a) h is a X -conditional probability mass function over Z
(b) h is of complexity sh = O(2
4ℓǫ−2) with respect to D
(c) (X,Z) and (X,hsim(X)) are indistinguishable, which in terms of g
and h means ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z
E
x∼X
[D(x, z) · (g(x, z)− h(x, z))]
∣∣∣∣∣ 6 ǫ (2)
The sketch of the construction is shown in ?? 1. Here we would like to point out
two things. First, we stress that we do not produce a strictly positive function;
what our algorithm guarantees, is that the total negative mass issmall. We will
see later that this is enough. Second, our algorithm performs essentially same
operations for every x, which is why its complexity depends only on Z.
For simplicity (and without losing generality) we assume X = {0, 1}n and
Z = {0, 1}ℓ. We also denote for shortness D(x, z) = D(x, z) − Ez′←UZ D(x, z
′)
for any D (the ”shift” transformation)
8 We consider the security of AES256 as a weak PRF, and not a standard PRF, because
of non-uniform attacks which show that no PRF with a k-bit key can have s/ǫ ≈ 2k
security [DTT09], at least unless we additionally require ǫ≫ 2−k/2.
9 This is a standard assumption in indistinguishability proofs. We can always extend
the class by adding −D for every D ∈ D, which increases the complexity only by 1.
Algorithm 1: Construct a Simulator
input : Function g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}ℓ → [0, 1], accuracy paramter ǫ > 0,
class D, step γ
output: Function h which is ǫ-indistinguishable from g under D, add up to
1 for every x, and with total negative mass smaller γ|Z|3
1 t← 0
h0(x, z)← 1
|Z|
for every x and z
while exists D ∈ D such that Ex∼X
[∑
z D(x, z) ·
(
g(x, z′)− ht(x, z′)
)]
> ǫ
do /* while the simulator is not good enough */
2 D
t+1 ← D
for z′ ∈ Z do /* improve the simulator towards the
distinguisher direction */
3 ht+1(x, z′)← ht(x, z′) + γ ·Dt+1(x, z′)
4 t← t+ 1
m← 0
for z′ ∈ Z do /* locate the biggest negative point mass */
5 if ht(x, z′) < m then
6 m← h˜t(x, z′)
z− ← z′
7 ht(x, z−) = 0 /* cut the biggest negative mass */ for z′ ∈ Z do
8 ht(x, z′)← ht(x, z′) + m
|Z|−1
/* redestribute the cut mass */
9 return ht(x, z)
Proof. Consider the functions ht. Define h˜t+1(x, z)
def
= ht(x, z) + D
t+1
(x, z).
According to ?? 1, we have
ht+1(x, z) = ht(x, z) + γ ·D
t+1
(x, z) + θt+1(x, z) (3)
with the correction term θt,r+1(x, z) that be computed recursively as (see ?? 1
in ?? 1)
θt,0(x, z) = 0
θt,r+1(x, z) =


−min
(
ht(x, z) + γ ·D
t+1
(x, z), 0
)
, if z = ztmin(x)
min
(
ht(x,ztmin(x)))+D
t+1
(x,ztmin(x)),0
)
#Z−1 if z 6= z
t
min(x)
t = 0, 1, . . .
(4)
where ztmin(x) is one of the points z minimizing h
t(x, z)+D
t+1
(x, z). In particular
ht(x, ztmin(x))) +D
t+1
(x, ztmin(x)) < 0⇐⇒ ∃z : h
t(x, z) +D
t+1
(x, z) < 0 (5)
Notation: for notational convenience we indenify the functions D
t
(x, z), θt(x, z),
h˜t(x, z) and ht(x, z) with matrices where x are columns and z are rows.
Claim 1 (Complextity of ?? 1). T executions of the “while loop” can be realized
with time O (T · |Z| · size(D)) and memory O(|Z|). 10.
This claim describes precisely resources required to compute the function hT for
every T . In order to bound T , we define the energy function as follows:
Claim 2 (Energy function). Define the auxiliary function
∆t =
t−1∑
i=0
E
x∼X
[
D
i+1
x ·
(
gx − h
i
x
)]
. (6)
Then we have ∆t = E1 + E2 where
E1 =
1
γ
Ex∼X
[(
htx − h
0
x
)
· gx +
1
2
∑t−1
i=0
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)2
− 12
(
(htx)
2
−
(
h0x
)2)]
E2 =
1
γ
Ex∼X
[
−
∑t−1
i=0 θ
i+1
x ·
(
gx − h
i+1
x
)
−
∑t−1
i=0 θ
i+1
x ·
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)]
(7)
The proof is based on simple algebraic manipulations and appears in Appendix B.
Remark 2 (Technical issues and intuitions). From Equation (7) it is clear that
we need two important properties
(a) Boundedness of correction terms, that is ideally |θi(x.z)| = O(poly(|Z|) · γ).
(b) Acute angle between the correction and the error, that is θix · (gx − h
i
x) > 0.
Below we present an outline of the proof, discussing more technical parts in the
appendix.
Proof outline. Indeed, with these assumptions we can prove that
E1 + E2 6 O
(
poly(|Z|) ·
(
tγ + γ−1
))
.
Since in the other hand we have tǫ 6 ∆t, setting γ = ǫ/poly(|Z) we get that
the algorithm terminates after at most T = poly(|Z|)ǫ−2 steps. We stress that it
outputs only a signed measure, not a probability distribution. However, because
of property (a) the negative mass is only of order poly(|Z|)ǫ and the function
we end with can be simply rescaled (we replace negative masses by 0 and nor-
malize the function dividing by a factor 1 − m where m is the total negative
mass). With this transformation, we replace the expected advantage O(ǫ) by
slightly worse O (poly(|Z|)ǫ). We can then replace ǫ to get a clear dependency.
Finally, we need to remember that we construct only a probability distribution
function, not a sampler. Transforming it into a sampler yields an overhead of
O(Z). This discussion shows that it is possible to build a sampler of complexity
poly(|Z|)ǫ−2. A more carefull inspection of the proof shows that we can actually
achieve |Z|5ǫ−2.
10 The RAM model
Technical Discussion We note that condition (b) somehow means that mass
cuts should go in the right direction, as it is much simpler to prove that ?? 1
terminates when there are no correction terms θt; thus we don’t want to go in
a wrong direction and ruin the energy gain. Concrete bounds on properties (a)
and (b) are given in Claims 3 and 4.
In ?? 1 in every round we shift only one negative point mass (see ?? 1).
However, since this point mass is chosen to be as big as possible and since ht+1
and ht differ only by a small term γ · D
t+1
except the mass shift θt+1, one
can expect that we have the negative mass under control. Indeed, this is stated
precisely in Claim 3 below.
Claim 3 (The total negative mass is small). Let
NegativeMass(ht(x, ·)) = −
∑
z
min(ht(x, z), 0)
be the total negative mass in ht(x, z) as the function of z. Then we have
NegativeMass(ht(x, ·) < |Z|3γ. (8)
for every x and every t.
The proof is based on a recurrence relation that links NegativeMass(ht+1(x, ·)
with NegativeMass(ht(x, ·), and appears in Appendix C.
Claim 4 (The angle formed by the correction and the difference vector is acute).
For every x, t we have Angle
(
θt+1x , gx − h
t+1
x
)
∈
[
−π2 ,
π
2
]
.
The proof appears in Appendix D.
4 Time-success ratio under algebraic transformations
In Lemma 1 below we provide a quantitative analysis of how the time-success
ratio changes under concrete formulas in security reductions.
Lemma 1 (Time-success ratio for algebraic transformations). Let a, b, c
and A,B,C be positive constants. Suppose that P ′ is secure against adversaries
(s′, ǫ′), whenever P is secure against adversaries (s, ǫ), where
s′ = s · cǫC − bǫ−B
ǫ′ = aǫA.
(9)
In addition, suppose that the following condition is satisfied
A 6 C + 1. (10)
Then the following is true: if P is 2k-secure, then P ′ is 2k
′
-secure (in the sense
of Definition 4) where
k′ =
{
A
B+C+1k +
A
B+C+1 (log c− log b)− log a, b > 1
A
C+1k +
A
C+1 log c− log a, b = 0
(11)
The proof is elementary though not immediate. It can be found in [Sko15].
Remark 3 (On the technical condition (10)). This condition is satisfied in almost
all applications, at in the reduction proof typically ǫ′ cannot be better (meaning
higher exponent) than ǫ. Thus, quite often we have A 6 1.
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A More on the flaw in [JP14]
In the original setting we have Z = {0, 1}λ. In the proof of the claimed better
bound O
(
s · 23λǫ−2
)
there is a mistake on page 18 (eprint version), when the
authors enforce a signed measure to be a probability measure by a mass shifting
argument. The number M defined there is in fact a function of x and is hard
to compute, whereas the original proof amuses that this is a constant indepen-
dent of x. During iterations of the boosting loop, this number is used to modify
distinguishers class step by step, which drastically blows up the complexity (ex-
ponentially in the number of steps, which is already polynomial in ǫ). In the
min-max based proof giving the bound O
(
s · 23λǫ−4
)
a fixable flaw is a missing
factor of 2λ in the complexity (page 16 in the eprint version), which is because
what is constructed in the proof is only a probability mass function, not yet a
sampler [Pie15].
B Proof of Claim 2
We can rewrite Equation (6) as
∆t =
1
γ
E
x∼X
[
t−1∑
i=0
((
hi+1x − h
i
x
)
− θi+1x
)
·
(
gx − h
i
x
)]
=
1
γ
E
x∼X
[
t−1∑
i=0
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)
·
(
gx − h
i
x
)
−
t−1∑
i=0
θi+1x ·
(
gx − h
i
x
)]
(12)
First, note that
t−1∑
i=0
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)
·
(
gx − h
i
x
)
=
=
(
htx − h
0
x
)
· gx −
t−1∑
i=0
hix ·
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)
=
(
htx − h
0
x
)
· gx +
1
2
t−1∑
i=0
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)
·
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)
+
−
1
2
t−1∑
i=0
(
hi+1x + h
i
x
)
·
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)
=
(
htx − h
0
x
)
· gx +
1
2
t−1∑
i=0
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)2
−
1
2
((
htx
)2
−
(
h0x
)2)
(13)
As to the second term in Equation (12), we observe that
−
t−1∑
i=0
θi+1x ·
(
gx − h
i
x
)
= −
t−1∑
i=0
θi+1x ·
(
gx − h
i+1
x
)
−
t−1∑
i=0
θi+1x ·
(
hi+1x − h
i
x
)
(14)
C Proof of Claim 3
Proof (Proof of Claim 3). We start by comparing the total negative mass in
the functions ht+1 = ht +D
t+1
+ θt+1 and ht. Suppose first that h˜t(x, z0) < 0
where z0 = z
t
min(x). Since
∑
z 6=z0
h˜t+1 = 1 − h˜t+1(x, z0), there exists z1 such
that h˜t+1(x, z1) >
1−h˜t+1(x,z0)
|Z|−1 > 0. Combining this with Equation (4) we obtain
ht+1(x, z1) = h˜
t+1(x, z1) +
h˜t+1(x, z0)
|Z| − 1
>
1
|Z| − 1
(15)
By ?? we have∑
z∈Z
min
(
ht+1(x, z), 0
)
=
∑
z∈Z
min
(
h˜t+1(x, z) + θt+1(x, z), 0
)
=
∑
z∈Z\{z0,z1}
min
(
h˜t+1(x, z) +
h˜t+1(x, z0)
|Z| − 1
, 0
)
+
+min
(
h˜t+1(x, z1) +
h˜t+1(x, z0)
|Z| − 1
, 0
)
>
∑
z←Z\{z0,z1}
(
min(h˜t+1(x, z), 0) +
h˜t+1(x, z0)
|Z| − 1
)
+min(h˜t+1(x, z0), 0)− h˜
t+1(x, z0) + min
(
h˜t+1(x, z1), 0
)
=
∑
z∈Z
min(h˜t+1(x, z), 0)−
h˜t+1(x, z0)
|Z| − 1
(16)
where the inequality line follows from h˜t+1(x, z0) < 0 and Equation (15). But
by the definition of ztmin(x) in ?? we get
h˜t+1(x, z0) 6
1
|Z| − 1
·
∑
z∈Z
min
(
h˜t+1(x, z), 0
)
(17)
Combining Equation (16) and Equation (17) we obtain
−
∑
z∈Z
min
(
ht+1(x, z), 0
)
6 −
(
1−
1
(|Z| − 1)2
)∑
z∈Z
min
(
h˜t+1(x, z), 0
)
. (18)
Since |ht+1(x, z)− h˜t(x, z)| 6 γ by Equation (3), we get the following recursion
−
∑
z∈Z
min
(
ht+1(x, z), 0
)
6 −
(
1−
1
(|Z| − 1)2
)∑
z∈Z
min
(
ht(x, z), 0
)
+ |Z|γ
(19)
which can be rewritten as
NegativeMass
(
ht+1(x, ·)
)
<
(
1−
1
|Z|2
)
NegativeMass
(
ht(x, ·)
)
+ |Z|γ. (20)
which is in addition trivially true if h˜t+1(x, z) > 0 for all z. The result follows
by expanding this recursion till t = 0.
D Proof of Claim 4
Proof. If θt+1(x, z) = 0 then there is nothing to prove. Suppose that θt+1(x, z) <
0. Let z0 = z
t
min(x). According to Equation (4) we have θ
t+1(x, z0) = −h˜
t+1(x, z0)
and θt+1(x, z) = h˜
t+1(x,z0)
#Z−1 for z 6= z0. Therefore
θt+1x ·
(
gx − h˜
t+1
x
)
= −h˜t+1(x, z0)
(
g(x, z0)− h˜
t+1(x, z0)
)
+
+
∑
z 6=z0
h˜t+1(x, z0)
|Z| − 1
·
(
g(x, z)− h˜t+1(x, z)
)
= −h˜t+1(x, z0)
(
g(x, z0)− h˜
t+1(x, z0)
)
−
h˜t+1(x, z0)
|Z| − 1
(
g(x, z0)− h˜
t+1(x, z0)
)
(21)
and
−θt+1x · θ
t+1
x = −h˜
t+1(x, z0) · h˜
t+1(x, z0)
(
1 +
1
|Z − 1|
)
. (22)
Putting Equations (21) and (22) together we obtain
θt+1x ·
(
gx − h
t+1
x
)
= θt+1x ·
(
gx − h˜
t+1
x
)
− θt+1x · θ
t+1
x
= −
(
1 +
1
|Z| − 1
)
h˜t+1(x, z0) · g(x, z0)
which is positive because h˜t,r(x, z0) < 0 and g(x, z0) > 0. This proves Claim 4.
